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The Problem of Unobserved Anomalies 
 
Abstract 
Scientific antirealism, the view that successful theories are empirically adequate, is untenable 
in light of the problem of unobserved anomalies that since past scientists could not observe 
the anomalies that caused the replacement of past theories with present theories, present 
scientists also cannot observe the anomalies that will cause the replacement of present 
theories with future theories. There are several moves that antirealists would be tempted to 
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This paper defines scientific antirealism as the view that successful theories, such as the 
oxygen theory, the kinetic theory, the germ theory, and the special theory of relativity, are 
merely empirically adequate. I argue that antirealism cannot survive a pessimistic induction 
that I call the problem of unobserved anomalies.1 It holds that since past scientists could not 
observe the anomalies that caused scientific revolutions, it is likely that present scientists also 
cannot observe anomalies that will cause scientific revolutions.2 On this account, both past 
and present theories are empirically inadequate. 
In this paper, ‘pessimists’ refers to those who embrace the problem of unobserved 
anomalies. Of course, they are different from other pessimists, such as P. Kyle Stanford (2006) 
and K. Brad Wray (2013), in that the former attack antirealism whereas the latter attack 
scientific realism. This paper unfolds a debate between antirealists and the former pessimists. 
Thus, antirealists’ interlocutors in this paper are not realists but the pessimists who attack 
antirealism with the problem of unobserved anomalies. There are no realists in this paper. So 
in this paper, it is illegitimate for antirealists to challenge their interlocutors to defend realism 
from their objections. 
This paper is radically different from other papers in the literature in that it focuses on 
whether antirealism is tenable or not vis-à-vis a pessimistic induction, whereas other papers 
tend to focus on whether realism is tenable or not vis-à-vis other pessimistic inductions. This 
paper is built upon the idea that antirealism, to be a viable contender to realism, should 
withstand criticisms similar to those leveled at realism, and on the observation that 
                                                          
1 The term ‘unobserved anomalies’ originates from Seungbae Park (2001: 32). 
2 I drop ‘likely’ hereafter for the sake of convenience. 
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antirealists have not paid attention to the disconcerting issue that their criticisms against 
realism also apply to their position. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I flesh out the problem of 
unobserved anomalies. In Section 3, I anticipate and criticize the following possible 
antirealist responses to it. First, scientific theories making novel predictions are empirically 
adequate. Second, pessimists should bear some burdens of proof. Third, successful theories 
are good instruments for making predictions. Fourth, antirealists are not committed to any 
positive position. Fifth, antirealists might hold a weaker position that it is better to believe 
that successful theories are empirically adequate than to believe that they are true. It will 
become clear that none of these responses is satisfactory. 
 
2. The Problem of Unobserved Anomalies 
Bas van Fraassen (1985: 294) claims that successful theories are empirically adequate. 
Similarly, Wray says that “all that scientists can claim to know about their background 
theories is that they save the phenomena and are superior to the theories with which they 
were compared” (2008: 321). To say that a theory saves phenomena means that it is 
empirically adequate (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). In another paper, Wray maintains that neither 
“realist nor anti-realist denies that the claims that successful scientific theories make about 
observable phenomena are true” (2012: 376). Mario Alai interprets constructive empiricism 
as maintaining that “all we need to believe is that a theory is empirically adequate” (2017: 21). 
Thus, van Fraassen, Wray, and Alai would agree with the present definition of antirealism 
that successful theories are empirically adequate. 
Are we justified in believing that successful theories are empirically adequate? Three 
philosophers (Park, 2001: 78; Lange, 2002: 282; Lyons, 2003: 898) say no, running a 
pessimistic induction against antirealism. It holds that since past theories, such as the 
phlogiston theory, the caloric theory, and Newtonian mechanics, were empirically inadequate, 
present theories, such as the oxygen theory, the kinetic theory, and the theory of relativity, are 
also empirically inadequate. Present theories may appear to be empirically adequate, but they 
will turn out to be empirically inadequate, just as past theories did. 
Past theories turned out to be empirically inadequate via running into anomalies, i.e., 
via clashing with phenomena that they could not explain. The anomalies, however, were not 
observed by proponents of past theories, although they fell within the domains of past 
theories. They were later observed by subsequent scientists, and then triggered scientific 
revolutions. For example, the perihelion motion of Mercury was not observed by Newton, 
although it fell within the domain of Newtonian mechanics. It was later observed and led to 
the replacement of Newtonian mechanics with Einsteinian mechanics. It was an unobserved 
anomaly to Newtonian mechanics 
Now that the concept of an unobserved anomaly is clear, we are ready to formulate the 
problem of unobserved anomalies: since past scientists could not observe the anomalies that 
caused the replacement of their theories with present theories, present scientists also cannot 
observe the anomalies that will cause the replacement of present theories with future theories. 
Future scientists will be able to observe the anomalies to present theories, just as present 
scientists can observe the anomalies to past theories. Present theories may appear to be 
empirically adequate, but future data will reveal that they are empirically inadequate. It is not 
merely possible but likely that present theories will go the way of past theories. 
The problem of unobserved anomalies combines the aforementioned three philosophers’ 
pessimistic induction against antirealism with Thomas Kuhn’s view (1962/1970) on the 
causes of scientific revolutions. Kuhn claims that a scientific revolution is caused by the 
accumulation of serious anomalies and by the advent of a new paradigm. In the absence of 
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either, a scientific upheaval cannot occur. The pessimistic induction against antirealism and 
Kuhn’s view jointly imply that present theories will run into hitherto unobserved anomalies, 
just as past theories ran into anomalies that had previously been unobserved, and that as a 
result, present theories will be superseded by future theories, just as past theories have been 
superseded by present theories. 
The problem of unobserved anomalies consists of the premise that past scientists could 
not observe the anomalies to past theories, and the conclusion that present scientists cannot 
observe the anomalies to present theories. The premise can be justified by Stanford’s long list 
of transitions from past to present theories: 
 
Stanford’s List 
from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl’s phlogiston theory to Lavoisier’s 
oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary chemistry 
 
from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology 
 
from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories 
 
from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and 
contemporary electromagnetism 
 
from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease 
 
from eighteenth century corpuscular theories of light to nineteenth century wave theories to the 
contemporary quantum mechanical conception 
 
from Darwin’s pangenesis theory of inheritance to Weismann’s germ-plasm theory to 
Mendelian and then contemporary molecular genetics 
 
from Cuvier’s theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species and 
from Lamarck’s autogenesis to Darwin’s evolutionary theory (Stanford, 2006: 19-20) 
 
This list is intended to support the premise that past scientists could not conceive of present 
theories. The premise allegedly supports the conclusion that present scientists cannot 
conceive of future theories. The premise and the conclusion jointly comprise what is called 
the problem of unconceived alternatives. 
The problem of unobserved anomalies mirrors the problem of unconceived alternatives. 
If Stanford’s list supports the premise of the problem of unconceived alternatives, it also 
supports the premise of the problem of unobserved anomalies. There is no reason for thinking 
that it supports the former while it does not support the latter. Also, if the inference from the 
premise to the conclusion of the problem of unconceived alternatives is correct, the inference 
from the premise to the conclusion of the problem of unobserved anomalies is also correct. 
There is no reason for thinking that the former is correct while the latter is incorrect. So the 
problems of unobserved anomalies and unconceived alternatives enjoy the same inductive 
strength. There is a further similarity between them, viz., they both appeal to items that are 
initially not brought to scientists’ consciousness, but are later brought to their consciousness, 
and bring about scientific revolutions. 
There is a difference between the problems of unobserved anomalies and unconceived 
alternatives. As noted earlier, the problem of unobserved anomalies combines the pessimistic 
induction against antirealism with Kuhn’s view on the causes of scientific revolutions, 
whereas the problem of unconceived alternatives combines the pessimistic induction against 
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realism with the problem of underdetermination. The pessimistic induction against realism 
holds that since past theories turned out to be false, present theories will also turn out to be 
false (Poincaré, 1905/1952: 160; Mach, 1911: 17; Laudan, 1977: 126; Putnam, 1978: 25). The 
problem of underdetermination occurs when theories make different claims about 
unobservables but similar claims about observables. Thus, the problem of unobserved 
anomalies is leveled at antirealism, whereas the problem of unconceived alternatives is 
leveled at realism. 
In this section, I argued that the problem of unconceived anomalies poses a threat to 
antirealism. In the next section, I anticipate and rebut several possible antirealist responses to 
the problem of unobserved anomalies. 
 
3. Antirealist Responses and Their Problems 
3.1. Novel Prediction 
To avoid the problem of unobserved anomalies, antirealists might tap into Juha Saatsi’s 
critical response to the problem of unconceived alternatives. He contends that “the instances 
of unconceived underdetermination cited by Stanford by and large do not involve any novel 
predictive success” (2009: 358). Saatsi’s hope is that once realists believe that only those 
theories which make novel predictions are approximately true, they do not have to worry 
about the past theories on Stanford’s list because they did not make novel predictions. 
Utilizing Saatsi’s insight, antirealists might suggest that we were not justified in believing 
that past theories on Stanford’s list were empirically adequate, given that they did not make 
novel predictions, but we are justified in believing that present theories are empirically 
adequate, given that they make novel predictions. In other words, novel success reliably 
indicates empirical adequacy, although mere success does not. 
This move, however, is problematic in light of Stanford’s and Timothy Lyons’s replies 
to Saatsi’s move. Stanford objects that some past theories, for example, Fresnel’s wave theory 
of light, did make novel predictions (2009: 384). Lyons (2003: 898-899) puts forward a list of 
many past theories, such as the caloric theory, the phlogiston theory, and Dalton’s atomic 
theory, which he claims made novel predictions, and yet were false in the present light. 
Stanford’s and Lyons’s historical observations implies that even if antirealists raise their bar 
from success to novel success, antirealism is still vulnerable to the problem of unobserved 
anomalies. 
 
3.2. Creating Burdens of Proof 
Antirealists might seek a strategy of creating burdens of proof for pessimists. Different 
burdens of proof would arise, depending on whether there are finitely or infinitely many 
unconceived alternatives in the possibility space of unconceived alternatives. Stanford (2006: 
133) claims that the number of unconceived alternatives is infinite, whereas Samuel 
Ruhmkorff (2011) claims that it is finite. Instead of adjudicating between them, I explore the 
different burdens of proof that would arise in either case. In the end, however, under either 
assumption, the proffered antirealist strategy to tackle the problem of unobserved anomalies 
will be shown to be ineffective. 
Suppose first that there are a finite number of unconceived alternatives. Under this 
assumption, antirealists can argue that as Stanford’s long list shows, we have already 
discarded enough alternatives having unobserved anomalies, and we are now at the end of the 
finitely long chains of alternatives in the possibility space, i.e., current theories are free of 
unobserved anomalies. By contrast, pessimists can argue that we have not yet eliminated 
enough theories, and need to discard more before we reach unconceived alternatives which 
are free of unobserved anomalies. For example, the humoral theory and the miasma theory 
5 
 
have been eliminated, and the germ theory is accepted today. Suppose that these are the only 
theories of diseases in the possibility space of alternatives. In such a case, we have already 
eliminated enough alternatives having unobserved anomalies, so we can conclude that the 
germ theory does not have an unobserved anomaly. Suppose now that there are one million 
theories of diseases in the possibility space. In such a case, we have not yet eliminated 
enough alternatives having unobserved anomalies, so the germ theory has an unobserved 
anomaly. 
We do not know how large the finite number of theories of diseases is. Consequently, 
antirealists would challenge pessimists to present reasons for thinking that the pessimist 
belief that we have not yet eliminated enough theories is more likely to be true than the 
antirealist belief that we have already eliminated enough theories. Without such reasons, the 
problem of unobserved anomalies does not go through. Pessimists, however, would challenge 
antirealists to present reasons for thinking that the antirealist belief that we have already 
discarded enough alternatives is more likely to be true than the pessimist belief that we have 
not yet discarded enough theories. Without such reasons, we are not justified in believing that 
present theories are empirically adequate, and hence antirealism is not tenable. Thus, 
pessimists and antirealists have reached a stalemate. 
Suppose instead that there are an infinite number of unconceived alternatives. 
Pessimists would have a strong case against antirealism under this assumption. If there were 
infinitely many unconceived alternatives, unobserved anomalies would plague our theories 
indefinitely into the future. Theories free of unobserved anomalies would lie at the infinitely 
distant points of the infinitely long chains of unconceived alternatives. Since we are finite 
beings, we can only eliminate finitely many alternatives, and will never be able to reach 
points at which theories are free of unobserved anomalies.  
How could antirealists respond to this case? They could point out that the number of 
empirically adequate rivals can be infinite, appealing to van Fraassen’s famous example of 
the problem of underdetermination (1980: 46). He generates an infinite number of rival 
theories to Newtonian mechanics by varying the velocity of the solar system with respect to 
the absolute space. All the competitors share the three laws of motion and the law of gravity, 
but they do not share claims about the absolute velocity of the universe. If one of these 
competitors is true, then all of them would be empirically adequate. Thus, there can be 
infinitely many empirically adequate rivals, and such theories are all free of unobserved 
anomalies. 
How does van Fraassen’s example help antirealism? Antirealists can argue that 
unconceived alternatives, which are free of unobserved anomalies, take up an infinitely large 
portion of the infinitely long chain of unconceived alternatives, and that the set of such 
theories might include current theories. The problem of unobserved anomalies, however, 
requires the opposite assumption that the set does not include current theories. Consequently, 
pessimists have the burden to present reasons for thinking that their belief that the set does 
not include current theories is more likely to be true than the antirealist belief that the set does 
include current theories. In the absence of such reasons, the problem of unobserved 
anomalies does not go through. 
The observation that empirically adequate rivals can be infinitely many, however, 
cannot give antirealists what they need because empirically inadequate rivals can also be 
infinitely many. Given that Newtonian mechanics is empirically inadequate, van Fraassen’s 
example shows not only that there can be infinitely many empirically adequate rivals but also 
that there can be infinitely many empirically inadequate rivals. There is no reason for 
thinking that present theories are more likely to belong to the set of infinitely many 
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empirically adequate theories than to the set of infinitely many empirically inadequate 
theories. Thus, we are back to a stalemate between antirealists and pessimists. 
To summarize, it does not matter whether the number of unconceived alternatives is 
finite or infinite. It is up for grabs whether current theories are more or less likely to lie in the 
range of infinitely many empirically adequate rivals than in the range of infinitely many 
empirically inadequate rivals. Hence, we are not justified in believing that present theories 
are empirically adequate. 
 
3.3. Instrumentalism 
Stanford, a leading philosopher of science in the realism debate these days, embraces a 
positive position called epistemic instrumentalism. He defines it as follows: 
 
..what it means to be an instrumentalist about any particular theory is to believe the empirical 
predictions and recipes for intervention that the theory offers, but not the description of some 
part of nature in which those pragmatic recommendations are grounded. (Stanford, 2006: 195) 
 
To put it another way, instrumentalists believe that predictions of a successful theory are true, 
and use the theory to manipulate things, but do not believe that what it says about 
unobservables is true. It is not clear whether instrumentalists believe that all the predictions 
of a theory are true, and whether all the recipes derived from a theory are useful. So 
instrumentalism seems to be neutral as to whether successful theories are empirically 
adequate or less than empirically adequate. It appears, therefore, that the problem of 
unobserved anomalies does not spell doom for instrumentalism. 
On closer examination, however, the problem of unobserved anomalies does pose a 
threat to instrumentalism. It is not clear whether instrumentalists are justified in believing that 
present theories are good instruments for making predictions and for deriving recipes for 
intervention. Instrumentalists might contend that present theories are good instruments. 
Pessimists would, however, object that present theories are fated to be displaced by their 
successors due to unobserved anomalies. Such a consideration gives rise to the suspicion that 
they are bad instruments, although they now appear to be good instruments. Moreover, we do 
not believe today that past theories, such as the caloric theory and the ether theory, are good 
instruments, although our ancestors believed that they were. Similarly, although we believe 
now that present theories are good instruments, our descendants will not.  
Instrumentalists might reply that past theories are still good instruments, for we can 
still use them to make true predictions in certain domains. For example, we still use 
Newtonian mechanics to send a rocket to the moon. Since past theories are still good 
instruments, present theories will be good instruments for our descendents. As science 
progresses, our theories will be closer and closer to ideal usefulness. Present theories are 
closer to ideal usefulness than past theories. Analogously, future theories will be even closer 
to ideal usefulness than present theories. All of them are good instruments.  
A problem with this position is that present theories are fated to run into anomalies, just 
as past theories were, and hence we should worry that they might not work when they are 
applied to new phenomena despite the fact that the new phenomena belong to their domains. 
Can we call such theories good instruments? Pessimists might define ‘a good instrument’ as 
an instrument that works well even when it is applied to new phenomena in its domain, and 
then claim that present theories fall short of good instruments. Instrumentalists might retort 
that they are good instruments insofar as they work well when they are applied to old 
phenomena in their domains. Let me point out here that this dispute between pessimists and 
instrumentalists is merely terminological. That is, while instrumentalists are willing to ascribe 
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‘good instruments’ to past and present theories, pessimists are not. In such a dispute, it is 
merely a matter of taste whether to attribute ‘good instruments’ to past and present theories.3 
My critical response to instrumentalism here echoes Stanford’s (2015) critical response 
to selectivism. Stathis Psillos (1999: 127) claims that past theories were approximately true 
on the grounds that their working posits were true, although their idle posits were false. 
Stanford replies that the difference between pessimists and selectivists “is simply a difference 
of style or taste in applying the expression ‘approximately true’ rather than a substantive 
disagreement between them” (2015: 876). On his account, there is no fact of the matter as to 
whether to apply ‘approximately true’ to successful theories or not. I say the same thing about 
the difference between instrumentalists who attribute ‘good instruments’ to successful 
theories and pessimists who refuse do so. 
Antirealists might raise the following objection. Should we regard science now as 
utterly pointless? Should we have no confidence at all in its predictions about the future? An 
idea that leads to skepticism is absurd. As some philosophers put it, “Skepticism is an ugly 
threat; a philosophical position which leads to skepticism reduces itself to absurdity” 
(Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and van Fraassen 1997: 317). The problem of unobserved 
anomalies prohibits us from even believing that successful theories are good instruments. 
Therefore, it is an absurd idea. 
     Consider, however, that the problem of unobserved anomalies parallels the problem of 
unconceived alternatives. So if the former is absurd, the latter is also absurd. In order to avoid 
this criticism against the latter, Stanford would have to expose a relevant difference between 
the two problems that would entitle him to say that the problem of unobserved anomalies 
drives us to skepticism but the problem of unconceived alternatives does not. It is not clear to 
me what the relevant difference would be. 
 
3.4. Noncommittalism 
Antirealists might despair and adopt a new position that might be called noncommittalism. It 
is the position that is not committed to any claim. It is committed neither to the claim that 
successful theories are empirically adequate, nor to the claim that they are good instruments. 
So it is immune to the problem of unconceived anomalies. Nor is it committed to the claim 
that Cartesian skepticism is committed to, viz., the claim that we do not know anything about 
the world. So it is insusceptible to all the criticisms leveled at Cartesian skepticism. 
Noncommittalism is a perfect position in terms of its defensibility. It withstands any criticism 
because it is not committed to any claim that you think that it is committed to. It is natural, 
therefore, that noncommittalism gets around the problem of unobserved anomalies. 
There is, however, an epistemic disadvantage with noncommittalism. Noncommittalists 
ought to be noncommittal even about their own positive theories. Imagine that they worked 
day and night for several decades in their laboratories, and finally came up with a scientific 
theory. It has all the theoretical virtues, such as broad scope, accuracy, simplicity, and 
fruitfulness. The noncommittalists are so excited about their theory that they believe that it is 
true. They, however, ought not to believe that it is true. Nor ought they to even believe that it 
is empirically adequate. They simply ought to be noncommittal about it in accordance with 
noncommittalism.  
There is another epistemic disadvantage with noncommittalism. Noncommittalists 
should not have a problem with their epistemic colleagues who are noncommittal about their 
positive scientific theory. Their colleagues do not even believe that it is empirically adequate. 
If all of us were noncommittalists, none of us would be able to propagate to others our own 
                                                          
3 See Park (2015, 2016, 2017) for more criticisms against instrumentalism. 
8 
 
theories which we are confident about. So what? We have not only the epistemic goal to be 
safe when our epistemic colleagues advance their positive theories but also the epistemic goal 
to spread our positive theories to them (Park, 2017: 58). Noncommittalism is a useful 
epistemic policy to achieve the first goal, but not the second goal. 
The failure to achieve the second goal is accompanied by enormous practical 
disadvantages. Imagine that noncommittalists submit an application to the Norwegian Novel 
Committee for a Nobel Prize. To their disappointment, however, the committee does not even 
believe that their theory is a good instrument, and hence refuses to grant a Nobel Prize to the 
noncommittalists. The noncommittalists protest that their theory is so virtuous that the 
committee should believe that it is true or empirically adequate. The committee retorts that it 
is a double standard for the noncommittalists to expect that the committee would believe that 
it is true or empirically adequate. 
In sum, if you embrace noncommittalism, you can get around the problem of 
unconceived anomalies, but epistemic and practical disadvantages with it are so ponderous 
that you would not actually hold it in your daily life. You may hold it only for philosophical 
fun. Even from a philosophical perspective, it is hardly an impressive position. No mental 
energy is required to hold it. Brilliant antirealists would face the problem of unobserved 
anomalies head-on, and attempt to refute it instead of abandoning their position and 
embracing noncommittalism. In any event, pessimists’ interlocutors in this paper are not 
noncommittalists but antirealists, and antirealists should not be confounded with 
noncommittalists. 
 
3.5. Weaker Position 
Antirealists might retreat to a weaker position that it is better to believe that successful 
theories are empirically adequate than to believe that they are true. This position is committed 
neither to the view that successful theories are empirically adequate nor to the view that they 
are good instruments. So it does not fall prey to the problem of unobserved anomalies. 
     This antirealist position, however, is so weak that it is vulnerable to the criticisms that I 
launched at noncommittalism above. Imagine again that antirealists developed a scientific 
theory. It is so virtuous that they are inclined to believe that it is true or empirically adequate. 
They, however, should not even believe that it is a good instrument. They can only believe 
that it is better to believe that it is empirically adequate than to believe that it is true. Now, 
they submit an application to the Norwegian Novel Committee for a Novel Prize. To their 
dismay, however, the committee rejects their application, saying that they do not even believe 
that the antirealists’ theory is a good instrument, and that a scientific theory should be a good 
instrument to be worthy of consideration for a Nobel Prize. To be fair, the committee adds 
that although they do not believe that it is a good instrument, they believe that it is better to 
believe that it is empirically adequate than to believe that it is true.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The problem of unobserved anomalies parallels Stanford’s problem of unconceived 
alternatives. The two problems, however, are aimed at different targets. The former is leveled 
at antirealism, and the latter at realism. A moral from the problem of unobserved anomalies is 
that antirealists should be careful when they mount a criticism against realism. Otherwise, 
they may unwittingly set their own house on fire. 
Let me remind readers that the opposing interlocutors in this paper are antirealists who 
believe that successful theories are empirically adequate, and pessimists who believe that 
successful theories are empirically inadequate due to the problem of unobserved anomalies. 
They are not joined by realists who believe that successful theories are true. Brilliant 
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antirealists would attempt to defend antirealism from the problem of unobserved anomalies 
instead of requesting realists to defend realism from the problem of unobserved anomalies.  
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